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Towards a Greater Eurasia: Who, Why, What, and How?


Michael Emerson



 NAZARBAYEV
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Organizations and Abbreviations

| | |
|-------------|---|
| ADB | Asian Development Bank |
| ADMM | ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting |
| AICHR | ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights |
| APEC | Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation |
| ARF | ASEAN Regional Forum |
| ASEAN | Association of South East Asian Nations |
| ASEAN+3, +6 | ASEAN + 3 with China, South Korea, Japan, +6 with Australia, India, New Zealand |
| ASEM | Asia Europe Meeting |
| BRICS | Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa |
| CIS | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| EAS | East Asia Summit |
| EEA | European Economic Area |
| EurAsEC | EurAsian Economic Community |
| OSCE | Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| RCEP | Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership |
| RIC | Meetings of foreign ministers of Russia, India, China |
| SAARC | South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation |
| SCO | Shanghai Cooperation Organisation |
| TAC | Treaty of Amity and Cooperation |
| TPP | Trans-Pacific Partnership |
| UNFCCC | UN Framework Convention on Climate Change |



Towards a Greater Eurasia: Who, Why, What, and How?

Michael Emerson

Introduction

The author has been invited to reflect on the possible value of some conception of a Greater Eurasia, embracing the whole of Europe and Asia, called at times the Eurasian supercontinent. This is done in the four following sections, whose abbreviated titles are: *Who? Why? What? How?*

Who? The geographer easily identifies Europe and Asia, albeit with some ambiguity over the Arab world. While the land supercontinent of Eurasia is at the core of our interests, simple geography is hardly an adequate basis to bring into account all political and economic issues, given the major role of the United States in both the Euro-Atlantic and Asian-Pacific communities and the effective integration of Australasia into Asia affairs.

Why? Three important states have long identified themselves as Eurasian (Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey), but it could now be in their interests to broaden and modernize their original conceptions. The political geography of the Greater Eurasia is currently in a state of turmoil. New regional groupings centered around East and South East Asia are proliferating at amazing speed. At the same time Europe is undergoing its own turmoil. And if there are to be both trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific communities, should there not be also an overarching Greater Eurasian space in between or joining both? Or is it to remain an area defined in terms of its sub-regions, of selective links between sub-regions, and of its major states as independent poles in global affairs?

What? The possible agendas for the Greater Eurasia include first of all concrete matters that flow from land contiguity: land transport and energy pipeline corridors, trade relations and cross-border security problems of criminality and terrorism. But looking ahead the agendas will surely go much wider and deeper in the realms of strategic security, political ideologies, long-term socioeconomic challenges, and cultural values. With much of Asia joining or rejoining the ranks of the world's most advanced societies, there are huge issues of global leadership at stake.

How? This section reviews existing institutional initiatives and groupings across this vast space


and their relevance to the Greater Eurasian agendas. There would surely be few votes in favor of a huge new organization accounting for half the UN General Assembly and overlapping with many existing initiatives. The more interesting question is how existing bodies might be adapted to the emerging needs of the Greater Eurasia.

Our contention is that the idea of Greater Eurasia should not be dismissed as a remote fantasy but, recalling the first contacts between the Roman and Han empires two thousand years ago, it should be introduced into strategic and long-term thinking about how to facilitate a harmonious rise of Asia alongside and with the West.

Who? Contours of a Greater Eurasia

The first known map of the world (Map 1), that of the ancient Greek historian Strabo, as here reproduced, is quite appropriate for present purposes, since the world consisted then only of Eurasia with a little bit of Africa. The Bosphorus was to be the dividing line between Europe and Asia, and indeed this convention has remained ever since. The Greeks at this time knew about Asia only as far as India, thus replicating the geography of the Indo-European language groups. The Himalayas were known, but to their north it was terra incognita. China was a world unto itself, isolated geographically by mountains, deserts, and sea and was thus ignored by this early Euro-centric view of the world. It would have been good to balance this here with a China-centric Middle Kingdom map of the world, since the Chinese were already good at mapping at that time, but unfortunately it seems that no examples have survived. While the ancient Greeks were unaware of China, there is evidence that the Romans not only became massive importers of silk but also established some diplomatic connections with the Han empire in the first and second centuries (Morris 2010).

How to delimit Eurasia? A Lesser Eurasia would consist just of those states and peoples who already identify themselves as Eurasian to some significant degree, which would include Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. We explore their conceptions of Eurasia in the next section.



But a Greater Eurasia would embrace the whole of the supercontinent with all of Europe and all of Asia. Historically this supercontinent was long interconnected before the “new world” was discovered. The Roman and Han empires were connected through the Silk Road, facilitating trade in silk in exchange for gold and silver, from the first to third centuries A.D. The separation of Europe from Soviet Eurasia and China during the 20th century was the product of historically short-lived iron and bamboo curtains.

Arabia appears in Strabo’s map as a border-line region, antedating here the Arab empires, which were outstanding Eurasian achievements, from Granada to Samarkand, and with Islam spreading on into south and southeast Asia. But since the Arab world today stretches across all of North Africa, we limit its coverage in the present paper to Arabia’s strategic energy role across the whole of the Greater Eurasia.


Then what about Australasia, considered by the geographer to be a separate continent? Australia is no further by sea from Asia than is Japan from

the Asian mainland. Both Australia and New Zealand could, while hardly Asian, surely be considered “new Eurasians.”


This leads to the trickier issue of the US and Canada in Eurasian affairs. Both are integrated with Europe in so many ways. Both are in APEC and many other Asian initiatives. The US projects massive hard and soft power across the whole of the Greater Eurasia. While the US and Canada are not part of the geographer’s Eurasian supercontinent, their major presence in both Europe and Asia allow us to take inspiration from ASEAN+3 and brand them as part of “Greater Eurasia+2.”

The World Bank’s economic map of the world (Map 2) is also an encouragement to think in terms of the Greater Eurasia+2, given the small economic dimensions of Latin America and Africa, and it also dramatically illustrates the virtual separation of Europe and Asia.


Some basic data on the dimensions of the Greater Eurasia are summarized in Table 1 with four basic indicators: population, landmass, GDP, and GDP per capita for the top 12 states,



Source: Strabo, *Geographica*, circa AD 18, reproduced by Isaac Casaubon in *Geographica*, 1620.



Map 2 | The world according to the World Bank in 2009



Source: World Bank Development Report, 2009

entities of the Greater Eurasia, and for the Greater Eurasia+2. If all of those featured in any one of these columns were included in a large core group it would mean a Greater Eurasian G-22. In the aggregate the Greater Eurasia accounts for 68 percent of the world’s population and 59 percent of its GDP, while for the Greater Eurasia+2 the score becomes 73 percent of the world’s population and 83 percent of its GDP.

Why? Conceptions of Lesser and Greater Eurasias

All three states that straddle the geographer’s divide between Europe and Asia — Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkey - have long-established conceptions of Eurasia, to the point that they consider themselves owners of the idea.¹ But these are all “Lesser Eurasias” compared to the “Greater Eurasia” hypothesized in this paper, which makes it so important to consider how far these states and peoples may be open to the idea of newer and wider conceptions of the Greater Eurasia.

Old Eurasians

Russia has a long history of Eurasianism, dating back to the expanding Russian empire, which took in increasing numbers of Asian ethnicities. The Russian elite and intelligentsia readily adopted the term as a semantic device to legitimize the empire. Russia has for centuries, from Peter the Great to this day, been divided between Europeanist versus autonomous Russian, or Slavic-Orthodox, or Eurasian tendencies. As Dostoyevsky said in 1881, “In Europe we are Tatars, in Asia we are Europeans.”

Contemporary Russia sees a drive in favor of a Russian-led Eurasian Union, perceived as a response to the disappointing failure to integrate better with Europe in the post-Soviet period. But this is not new: for example one may recall the drive to expand to the East after Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War in 1855. In the 20th century there was a stream of theorizing about Russia’s Eurasian identity, with Lev Gumilev (1912-92) postulating that a unique synthesis of the ethnic Russians and Mongols had emerged in the Great Steppe area.

The argument that Eurasianism is for Russia a defence against the West is nowadays developed

1. This section draws on Laruelle 2008.




Table 1 | **Top 12 of Greater Eurasia**

| Rank | Country/Region | Population (millions) | Country/Region | Landmass, million km ² | Country/Region | GDP, \$ billions | Country/Region | GDP, per capita \$ |
|------|-------------------|-----------------------|----------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|--------------------|
| 1 | China | 1344 | Russia | 16376 | EU | 17584 | Japan | 45,903 |
| 2 | India | 1241 | China | 9327 | China | 7318 | Hong Kong | 35,156 |
| 3 | EU | 503 | EU | 4181 | Japan | 5867 | EU | 34,156 |
| 4 | Indonesia | 242 | India | 2973 | Russia | 1857 | Korea | 22,424 |
| 5 | Pakistan | 176 | Kazakhstan | 2699 | India | 1872 | Russia | 12,995 |
| 6 | Bangladesh | 150 | Iran | 1628 | Korea | 1116 | Kazakhstan | 11,357 |
| 7 | Russia | 143 | Mongolia | 1553 | Indonesia | 846 | Turkey | 7749 |
| 8 | Japan | 127 | Pakistan | 770 | Turkey | 775 | China | 5445 |
| 9 | Vietnam | 87 | Turkey | 769 | Thailand | 345 | Thailand | 4972 |
| 10 | Philippines | 94 | Myanmar | 653 | Iran | 331 | Iran | 4413 |
| 11 | Iran | 75 | Afghanistan | 652 | Malaysia | 287 | Ukraine | 3615 |
| 12 | Turkey | 73 | Ukraine | 579 | Hong Long | 248 | Indonesia | 3495 |
| | Europe* | 832 | | 23,039 | | 21,852 | | 26,264 |
| | Asia | 3871 | | 23,659 | | 19251 | | 5102 |
| | Greater Eurasia | 4773 | | 46,698 | | 41,103 | | 8611 |
| | Greater Eurasia+2 | | | | | | | |
| | United States | 315 | | 9826 | | 15,685 | | 49,736 |
| | Canada | 35 | | 9976 | | 1833 | | 52,371 |
| | World | 6974 | | 129,709 | | 70,020 | | 10,040 |
| | GEA/World | 68% | | 36% | | 59% | | 85% |
| | GEA+2/World | 73% | | 51% | | 83% | | 114% |

*Europe here includes all Council of Europe states (i.e. with 'Eurasian' Russia and Turkey).

N.B. The top 12 GDP per capita column here shown take into account only states entering into the top 12 by population, or landmass, or GDP. If the EU is disaggregated into its member states the top 12 by GDP per capita are almost all small states or entities, with the following and rank order: 1. Luxembourg, 2. Norway, 3. Switzerland, 4. Macao SAR (China), 5. Denmark, 6. Sweden, 7. Netherlands, 8. Austria, 9. Finland, 10. Belgium, 11. Singapore, 12. Germany, while at the Greater Eurasia+2 level Canada and the US would also qualify.



most energetically by Alexander Dugin, a prolific writer and propagandist, whose views combine strident Russian nationalism with Eurasianism. Regarded for some time as a neo-fascist crank, he now occupies an acknowledged role in the Russian political sphere with a considerable following. He founded an International Eurasianist Movement, an organization that has support in Kazakhstan and Turkey.

One of the priorities of President Putin during his new term of office beginning in 2012 is to build up the customs union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, both by extending its membership and by upgrading into a Eurasian Union by 2015. Ukraine is the main target for extended membership, but this seems to be rejected by Kiev, while Kyrgyzstan is a more likely new member. Putin has also spoken in favor of a common economic space from “Lisbon to Vladivostok,” without this idea moving much beyond the occasional speech. When asked how the customs union and “Lisbon to Vladivostok” should relate to each other, the official reply tends to be: first we will complete the Eurasian Union and then negotiate as a bloc with the European Union.


At the same time, more Europeanist ideas have remained active in the Russian national debate. When Dmitri Medvedev was president the idea of a Modernisation Partnership with the European Union was developed. Dmitri Trenin published in 2001 a book that was the antithesis of Dugin under the title *The End of Eurasia*. Trenin updated his narrative in 2011 with another book whose sub-title, “A Eurasian Story,” signalled a shift in interest in favor of a Greater Eurasia (without using the term) that embraced China, Japan, and Asia at large.

Turks long identified themselves through their Ottoman empire and thus more by religion than nationality. When the empire disintegrated, interest developed in the idea of a more ethnically and culturally homogenous Turkic space. There was a spillover of Pan-Slavist thinking into the shaping of Pan-Turkism. Tatar and Azeri nationalists contributed to the emergence of a Pan-Turkish philosophy, including the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinskii. Under the Westernizing reforms of Kemal Ataturk

Pan-Turkism had to give way to Turkish nationalism. However, in the 1960s Pan-Turkism returned to the political stage in Turkey, and by the 1980s there was an active Foundation for the Study of the Turkish World. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the Pan-Turkic idea received a huge stimulus, resulting in Turkey’s keen attempt to develop the concept politically in Central Asia. However Turkey overplayed its hand, with Pan-Turkism perceived as a threat to the legitimacy of the newly independent states. Discourse turned more to the role of Turkey as a bridge between West and East, rather than as a leader of an integration project. Nonetheless when in April 2013 Turkey became a dialogue partner of the SCO, foreign minister Davutoglu romantically commented that “Turkey will be part of a family, which is composed of the countries which lived together not for centuries – but for millennia” (Gundogan 2013). Yet Turkey’s simultaneous anchorage in both Europe and Asia, economically and politically, means that it would naturally seek an active role in any Greater Eurasia.

Russia’s own Turkic peoples have been active in the politics and ideology of Eurasianism, with Tatarstan playing the leading role. Their conception of Eurasianism is deeply embedded in the Islamic identity of these non-ethnic-Russian peoples of Russia. Tatarstan and other Turkic entities in Russia participate in the International Congress of Turkic Peoples.

Kazakhstan has an objective claim to be at the geographic epicenter of the Greater Eurasia. But more deeply, Kazakhstan saw in the 1960s the emergence of a distinct philosophy of Eurasianism in the writings of the poet and historian Olzhas Suleimenov, whose texts provided a positive reading of the Turkic peoples’ role in Russian history. At the political level President Nazarbayev proposed a Union of Eurasian States already in 1994, although this was too early to be taken up by Yeltsin’s Russia. Under President Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan has been a keen supporter of the Eurasian Economic Community, hosting in Almaty the headquarters of the Eurasian Development Bank and joining the customs union with Russia



and Belarus, notwithstanding some economic disadvantages (having to adopt Russia's higher external tariffs). But Nazabayev stretches the concept of Kazakhstan's role and identity much wider than the former Soviet Union. He promotes the idea that "Kazakhstan is a unique state in Asia, where European and Asian roots are intertwined. The combination of different cultures and traditions allows us to absorb what is best in both European and Asian culture," an approach that does not contain the anti-Westernism found in much Russian, and even some Turkish, discourse.

The origins of Turkic Eurasianism, however, lie in Mongolia, whose modern state is a legatee of the historical footprint of the Mongol hordes, who left lasting communities in the Volga region of Russia and Crimea in Ukraine. Moreover its empire held sway over China in the 13th century, and thus qualifies as the greatest Eurasian empire ever seen. But now in the 21st century Mongolia has impressed the world with its rapid transition from communism into a functioning liberal democracy, despite being wedged between China and Russia, chairing in April 2013 the 7th Ministerial Meeting of the Community of Democracies. In addition to being a member of the Congress of Turkic Peoples, Mongolia would have manifest interests in a Greater Eurasia that includes other functioning democracies, from Japan and India to the EU.

Indo-Europeans, the earliest Eurasians

Actually, the South Asians have the longest claim to be considered Eurasians, although they have been called Indo-Europeans. In the 16th century European visitors to India noticed resemblances between the main Indian and European languages, and by the 19th century the common roots of European and Indo-Iranian languages were firmly established academically. For sure, the speakers today of Urdu and German do not recognise their common root in the way that Turkic speaking peoples can. However the Indo-European links were robustly built on geographic proximity, including the shifting frontiers of some ancient Eurasian empires (Greek, Persian), contrasting with the


isolation of China walled off to the east by mountains and desert (Map 3).

In recent history the Indian subcontinent inherited enduring legacies from the colonial period, both bitter memories of colonialism but also, more relevant now, the acquisition of the English language and a democratic culture. The contemporary academic achievements of Indian academics in the most prestigious international universities and Indian contributions to contemporary English literature adds to familiarity and a sense of cosmopolitan identity at the elite level. At the level of popular culture also, the connections between India and the cosmopolitan world are very real. Among the large South Asian diasporas in Europe, and more broadly the English-speaking world, Indian communities see outstanding levels of educational and professional achievement. Major Indian direct investments have been recently made in European industries (by Mittal and Tata). All this would mean a certain predisposition in South Asia to favor open and cosmopolitan conceptions of a Greater Eurasia, even while India remains attached politically to its non-aligned tradition


New Eurasians?

Ask a Chinese man or a Frenchman whether he feels himself to be Eurasian, the answer will be short and negative. But the relevant question is what conceptions or functions of a Greater Eurasia could become interesting to Asians and Europeans in the foreseeable future.

China has gone global and is now massively present in all continents, driven by its voracious demands for commodity imports especially from Africa and Latin America, coupled with its dependence on the major export markets of the EU and US. Its economic structure is further highly interdependent with its East and Southeast Asian neighbors as part of numerous supply chains aimed at global markets. Its combined dependence on this neighborly supply chain for intermediate goods, with its dependence on the advanced EU and US markets as destinations for its final products, should in principle create a high




Map 3 | **Indo-European language branches within their homelands**



Source: Wikipedia, Indo-European branches map.png

strategic interest in achieving stable economic and political relations across the entire Greater Eurasia+2. China also has a clear interest in advancing the economic development of its own western and central provinces and taking pressure off the excessive concentration of economic

development on the eastern coastline, thus dampening internal west-east migration. This leads into the current heavy investments of transport infrastructures into Central Asia, with linkages through to Russia and Europe. China's political interest in the stability of Central Asia is also clear, given the



ethno-cultural links between its western provinces and Central Asia.

Also relevant to the present purpose are the Chinese communities in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, where individuals have by names that explicitly signal hyphenated identities, such as Peter Ho, Michael Song, and Serena Yu. These perfectly bilingual Chinese-English individuals are surely Greater Eurasian citizens and can play an invaluable role in bridging between more conservative Europeans and Asians.

ASEAN states, Japan, and Korea would have rather similar interests in a Greater Eurasia, and especially a Greater Eurasia+2. Their economic interests fit well alongside those of China, with now highly integrated manufacturing economies, growing intra-Asian trade flows, as well as huge interests in the EU and US markets. The ASEAN states are also exploring their own deepening integration, with a 2015 single market objective that has many points of similarity with the EU's single market. All are wary of Chinese hegemonic tendencies, in relation to which the Greater Eurasia+2 would offer some reassurance, with the advantage of being less divisive than the Trans-Pacific Partnership if it continues to develop without China.

As of today the EU seems not to think about Eurasia as such, but about Europe and Asia in separate boxes. Until recently the EU's core concept for its external relations was its own wider European neighborhood, organized in a web of concentric circles reaching at its outermost point Central Asia, sometimes dubbed "neighbors of the neighbors." At that point Europe's neighborhood ended. However in recent years the global dimension to EU foreign policy has advanced rapidly around 10 bilateral strategic partnerships, of which 7 belong to the Greater Eurasia+2: Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea, with Canada and the US. The content here is a combination of bilateral and global governance issues. Coming closer to the Greater Eurasia idea, the EU is also a keen advocate of continental regionalism and inter-regionalism worldwide. The EU has a serious relationship with ASEAN, whose single market program derives inspiration from the EU. The


EU would like to see the South Asian regionalism advance through the SAARC, but progress here is stalled. The EU project that gets closest to embracing Eurasia as a whole is the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which brings together the leaders of the EU and 25 Asian states in summit meetings every two years, but as discussed more fully below there is little attention as of yet to transcontinental connectivity, as reflected in the exclusion of Central Asia from ASEM.

Finally there are the two Australasian states, Australia and New Zealand. Already for some decades they have understood their future to lie in increasing integration with Asia, and this is seen politically today with their keen accession to several Asian and Asian-Pacific regional groupings. The current Australian prime minister is a speaker of Mandarin Chinese, a first such leader from any Western country. These two states can be branded as "new Eurasians."

The United States and Canada have been designated here as the "+2" on the basis of their strategic interests in both Euro-Atlantic and Asian-Pacific alliances and groupings. But also in societal terms, as immigrant nations, both have recently been enhancing their Eurasianism by adding streams of Asian immigration to their originally European culture. For example one may note the recent nomination of an American of Korean origin as head of the World Bank.

What? Agenda for a Greater Eurasia

An agenda for the Greater Eurasia may be divided into two parts: first, issues of current practical concern, especially those linked to the physical landmass of the supercontinent, and second, less tangible but more fundamental long-term challenges for society as a whole. The first category is thus largely made up of matters for pragmatic cooperation, while the second addresses often controversial issues of political values, economic models, society, and philosophies of life. Overall we may observe both the difficulties and potential for the Greater Eurasia to become more than a geographic reality.



Issues of current policy concern

There is a long list of topics that are of definite common concern across the Greater Eurasia.

Post-2014 Afghanistan

The chances that after NATO withdrawal Afghanistan will pose multiple security risks for its neighbors are such that there is already a Greater Eurasian initiative, called the Istanbul Process, which aims at anticipating the challenges and helping Afghanistan manage them (see further below on its institutional aspects). Six priority clusters are identified: education, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, disaster management, infrastructure, and trade and commerce development. The nexus of trafficking, criminality, illegal migration, and terrorism has risen up the top of the agenda across virtually the whole of the Greater Eurasia in the last two decades, under the double impact of the opening of the frontiers of the former Soviet Union and the rise of Islamic jihadism. However its epicenter lies in Afghanistan as the world's biggest producer of hard drugs and exporter of jihadism. After the failure of the US-led NATO military campaign to pacify Afghanistan, following the Soviet failure of the 1970s and that of the British empire a century earlier, all are aware of the huge challenge in containing these disorders after 2014. On a more positive note, these failures by past global hegemonies mean now at least there is a common awareness across the whole of the Greater Eurasia of the need for cooperative responses.

Unresolved land-border & ethno-territorial disputes

The list of unresolved ethno-territorial conflicts in the Greater Eurasia is long: from the several so-called frozen conflicts of the former Soviet space through to Kashmir, several Chinese-Indian border regions, and some flash points on Thailand's frontiers. At the normative level there is much common ground between the Helsinki basic principles of the OSCE and the similar principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Asia, but in neither case is there any solid record of conflict resolution. Many of these disputes seem indeed to defy resolution in spite of conciliation and attempted

confidence-building efforts over decades, and it is hard to see any simple institutional innovations that could overcome the obstacles to peace. In this situation there would have to be a change in political context more favorable to resolution, and here a movement towards a broad and deep Greater Eurasia might help.

Unresolved maritime border disputes


The disputed waters and islands of the China Seas now emerge as the most worrying source of tensions in the whole of the Greater Eurasia: between Russia and Japan over the Kuril Islands, between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, between China and Vietnam and the Philippines over the delimitation of borders in the South China Sea. Europe has some quite recent experience using the International Court of Justice or binding arbitration mechanisms for resolving differences peacefully and decisively, for example between Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea, with a new case between Croatia and Slovenia in the Adriatic now heading for binding arbitration. The Philippines now asks for arbitration from the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea to resolve its conflict with China over the Spratly islands. Could the Greater Eurasia converge on making predominant recourse to these legal processes to resolve cases of conflict?

Maritime security between the Gulf and Asia

Here the common threats are from piracy in the Indian Ocean offshore from Somalia and in the straits of Malacca. European and Asian naval cooperation in policing these major routes for energy and cargo traffic has been positive, and in the western part of the Indian Ocean the EU has taken the lead. There might be a more structured coordination framework between the major maritime powers of the Greater Eurasia.

Inland waterways

The Greater Eurasia has many of the world's greatest cross-border rivers: for example the Rhine, Danube, Amu Darya, Syr Darya, Irtysh, Ganges, Indus, and Mekong. The regimes for managing



these vital water courses ranges from the highly institutionalized and legally regulated cases (Rhine, Danube) to cases where there is no cooperative system at all (Amu Darya, Syr Darya) or only vague and incomplete multi-country agreements (Mekong). However the Indus has a notable water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan with support from the World Bank. On the other hand, the Ganges between India and Bangladesh and the Irtysh River from China to Russia through Kazakhstan are the subject of complaints of excessive upstream water take-off. Two of the most serious cross-border river environmental disasters of recent times saw toxic materials released into a Chinese tributary of the Amur River in Russia in 2005 and by a Hungarian enterprise into the Danube in 2010. All that is certain is that water management is going to be among the most sensitive sources of inter-state tensions in the decades ahead with rising economic development and populations, which makes the pursuit of consensus over norms and best practice between the most concerned states of the Greater Eurasia strongly needed.

Land transport - road

Important investments are being made in land corridors across the Greater Eurasian space for road traffic under the aegis of three separate initiatives, one based on the EU's Pan-European corridors and Traceca program, a second based on the Eurasian Economic Community, and CAREC, an initiative driven by the Asian Development Bank and supported by China. Central Asia in particular sees now large-scale investments under the CAREC program, funded by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, with additional investments by the Eurasian Development Bank. These three broad programs, led by the EU, China, and Russia respectively, come together in Central Asia and especially in Kazakhstan, given its very large geographic dimensions. The EU and CAREC programs are not really coordinated, and there are anomalies as a result, with the shortest routes between the EU and East

Asia not assured, and this is an issue deserving consideration at the Greater Eurasian level.²


Land transport – rail

Rail transport should in principle become a greatly expanded transport mode across the whole of the Greater Eurasia, given its economic and environmental advantages for large freight volumes compared to road transport. Unfortunately the historic development of railway lines has resulted in several different rail gauges. China and Europe share the same gauge but are separated by the former Soviet Union, which uses another. Crossing points between these different systems involves costly and time-consuming transfer (either transferring containers or lifting wagons on to different wheel bases). There is a conceivable southerly route between China and the EU, which sees the same European gauge extend through the Balkans and across Turkey and Iran. The connection with China would “only” need fresh investments in Afghanistan and Tajikistan to have a network with a common gauge (see Vinokurov 2013). A hugely ambitious idea has been discussed in China for a high-speed rail connection from “Beijing to Berlin.” China’s own high speed network is already substantially complete all the way to its Western provinces (almost half the way to Berlin). It would presuppose a dedicated rail track of the same Euro-Chinese gauge all the way. This would be a 21st century version of the old Orient Express from Paris to Istanbul, and would surely excite the imagination as a project for integrating the Greater Eurasian space like nothing else. However its main justification would be for freight traffic. For the time being there are some modest steps being taken to open up EU-China rail freight connections with a route from Zhengzhou through China, across Kazakhstan and then through Russia, Belarus, and Poland before arriving in Hamburg (Bocking 2013).

Air transport

The Greater Eurasian airspace is massive, and the competition between airport hubs fierce:


2. For a more detailed discussion see Vinokurov 2013.




London, Paris, Frankfurt, and Moscow in Europe; Istanbul, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi in the Middle East; Astana, Almaty, and Tashkent in Central Asia; and Bangkok and Singapore etc. in Asia. The rules of overflying and freedom of the skies are governed by the International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA), under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Europe, South and Central Asia, Korea, Japan, and most ASEAN states have acceded to the IASTA, but China and Russia have not. After over a decade of bilateral negotiations with the EU, Russia agreed to abolish overfly rights as part of the deal for its entry into the WTO, but this agreement has not been implemented by Russia under various pretexts. Since there are no comparable problems for flights across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, there is a case here for focused attention at the level of Greater Eurasia to facilitate key bilateral agreements or secure wider accession to the IASTA.

IT interconnectivity

Building modern information super highways depends on laying long-distance fiber optic cables, such as those that already exist in the US, Europe, and East Asia and also across the Atlantic and Pacific, as Map 4 shows. As of today, no Trans-Eurasian information super highway exists, although there are proposals along these lines. In particular the UN General Assembly in December 2012 adopted a resolution in support of a “Trans-Eurasian Information Super Highway” project being sponsored by the Eurasian Connectivity Alliance following ministerial meetings of many European and Asian states sponsored by Azerbaijan in Baku. Two routes are proposed, both transiting between Europe and China via Kazakhstan, with a northern route proceeding first through Ukraine and southern Russian, and a southern route through Turkey, the Caucasus, and a submarine cable across the Caspian Sea. These interesting ideas should be followed up at the Greater Eurasia level.



Source: Telegraphy Research



Trade

The present time sees an unprecedented proliferation of bilateral free or preferential trade agreements. This goes alongside and is a reaction to the stalling of the WTO Doha multilateral negotiations. ASEAN itself is at the heart of a huge web of bilateral and plurilateral agreements, partly already functioning, with major extensions under negotiation or political discussion, including possibly a plurilateral FTA with China, Korea, and Japan, with further Trans-Pacific initiatives under development. While organizational arrangements are discussed in more detail below, a number of overarching issues stand out. First, the momentum of East Asian and Trans-Pacific trade liberalization is very impressive, but also points towards the need for rationalizing and simplifying this hugely complex “noodle bowl” of Asian FTAs. Second, is the question of how far the EU is going to join in this Asian-Pacific trade area; it has several FTAs already (Korea) under negotiation (India, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam), but not with ASEAN as a bloc or with China. Third, Russia’s network of preferential trade agreements is limited to the former Soviet area and is much more closed to Asia, although as mentioned above the “Lisbon to Vladivostok” idea is mentioned in some speeches. For the long run one may envisage the scenario of progressive moves towards a giant Greater Eurasian FTA. But the idea of such schemes leads on to the question whether the liberal advanced economies might form a large core group within the WTO, thus multilateralizing the process and rescuing the WTO from its Doha Round impasse.

Environmental and climate policy

Negotiations over climate change are solidly structured at the global level through the UNFCCC. However, the pursuit of globally regulated solutions is hardly advancing, while the chances of a global climate change disaster are extremely serious. Attention therefore switches to decentralized processes, seeking in particular the diffusion of best technologies and experience of policy mechanisms. In the Greater Eurasian space the predominant polluters are China, India, Russia,

and the EU. Consideration could be given to shaping this group into an environmental G4 of the Greater Eurasia. The EU has much to offer by way of both technologies and policy experience, including hard lessons being learned for its own emission trading and carbon market mechanisms. China has made huge advances in renewables, yet is also still building huge new coal-burning power station capacity. Both the EU and China are trying to develop carbon capture and storage technologies, and if successful should have major applications in other major coal producers, including Russia, India, and Kazakhstan.

Seismic hazards

The Greater Eurasian space sees a wide band of vulnerability to seismic hazards, stretching from southeast Europe through western and south Asia into China (see Map 5). This should be a theme for common research on preventive measures and cooperative mechanism for mutual support in rescue operations.

Energy cooperation

With the US now becoming again energy independent, the predominant architecture of the international energy economy becomes ever more clearly one in which there is a huge central production zone in the middle of the Greater Eurasia, consisting of the Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, and West Siberia, supplying both Europe to the west and the big Asian consumers to the east. With this comes the need for common ground rules, including standards for investment protection, the use of transit pipelines, and dispute settlement. There has been one attempt to do precisely this in the Eurasian space, namely the Energy Charter Treaty initiated by the EU in the early 1990s. Members include all of Europe and the post-Soviet space, plus some increasing Asia participation. We return this organization’s increasing “Eurasianization” below.


Organization and management of mega-cities

Of all the world’s mega-cities, defined as conurbations with populations of over 10 million, 20



Map
5

Global seismic hazardous regions



Source: Global Seismic Hazard Assessment Program <http://www.seismo.ethz.ch/static/GSHAP/global/gshapfin.gif>

of 28 lie in the Greater Eurasian area (see Annex 5). Of these only three are in Europe (Moscow, London, Paris), one literally bridges Eurasia (Istanbul), leaving the mass of 17 megacities in Asia. The technologies and policy mechanisms for mega-cities include environmental and waste disposal methods, traffic management and anti-congestion measures, and urban development models. Some European cities have made major advances in these domains and might usefully contribute to a working group of mega-cities of Greater Eurasia. The OECD has already invested in an interesting program in this area, but so far it has been mainly confined to the mega-cities of advanced countries. However this is the kind of program that OECD could be invited to Eurasianize to a higher degree, or with specifically tailored programs.


Migration and restrictions on the movement of peoples

Demographic trends and income inequalities are going to remain drivers of migrational pressure across the Greater Eurasia with the EU and Russia, combining relatively high incomes with declining


populations of working age, with China also having now to come to terms with its severe aging profile. Restrictions on migration, however, are on the rise, with consequential pressures for illegal migration. At the same time, the competition for highly skilled labour is intense, leading to pressures from business communities for facilitated immigration and visa procedures for favored groups. Visa facilitation is in turn often linked, notably in the case of the EU, to demands for re-admission agreements, and here there arises a sharp issue for policy consistency across the Greater Eurasia (for example for the Asian illegal migrant into the EU who may pass through Central Asia, Russia, and Ukraine) (Map 6).

Drugs

Among the challenges posed by Afghanistan, the need to reduce drug production is a prime concern for the EU, Russia, and China alike. While reliable data is scarce, it is believed that drug production in Southeast Asia has been on a declining trend, but this seems not to be the case for Afghanistan (Linn and Tiomkin 2007). The major destinations of Afghan drugs are indeed the EU, Russia, and China, in all cases transiting through



Map 6 | **Flows of migration across Eurasia**



Source: Linn and Tiomkin 2005

Migration flows

Central Asia (Map 7). Policies to fight drug addiction have to work at all of three levels: curbing demand in consuming countries, strengthening border controls in transit countries, and curbing production in the source countries. The second and third axes require coordination across the Greater Eurasia, in support of the work of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Pandemics

The world is on the alert over the risks of new pandemics. But for the Greater Eurasia this is the oldest of stories. Piecing together fragments of evidence historians trace the parallel scourges of plagues in both the Roman and Han empires in the early centuries of the first millennium to trade links though the Silk Roads, with similar outbreaks


of plagues in the outposts of the Roman and Han armies at the eastern and western extremities of their respective empires (Morris 2010). While the scourges of earlier times (smallpox, cholera, malaria, typhus, tuberculosis) have been largely eliminated only in developed nations, new diseases with pandemic potential have emerged (SARS since 2003, Avian flu since 2004). The World Health Organization plays a central role in aiding prevention and response to outbreaks, but the states of the Greater Eurasia may need specific coordinating mechanisms, such as for the closing of land frontiers in emergencies.

Towards a Greater Eurasian Community

Here we discuss long-term strategic matters and the normative foundations of what might



Map 7 | **Flows of drugs across Eurasia**



Source: Linn and Tiomkin 2005


← Drug flows

eventually become a Greater Eurasian community. At present there are major geopolitical cleavages across the Greater Eurasian area. Politically the Greater Eurasia is divided three ways between the democratic, the semi-democratic, and the non-democratic (see Annex 5), which is a limitation on the current scope for integration. The starting point therefore is full of problems, but the question is how to turn the trend in a positive direction towards the long-term goal.

Towards a security community

The strategic security regime in Greater Eurasia is highly unsatisfactory, despite the fact that the Greater Eurasia+2 accounts for all five of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. There are no inter-state wars in Asia these days,

but threat perceptions certainly exist, first of all between the pariah state of North Korea and everyone else, and then also the territorial and maritime border disputes already referred to above. Some of these tensions seem to have worsened in recent times. At the top geopolitical level the situation is also tense. Russia and the United States view each other with distrust and old Cold War attitudes, with Russia viewing US intentions to locate anti-missile defences in Europe, intended as protection against Iran, as undermining the capability of Russia's nuclear forces to obliterate Europe, which is hardly comforting for Europe itself. In the Pacific, Chinese and US aircraft carriers now face each other, with China developing missile capabilities that could destroy the US carriers, which are there to protect Japan and Taiwan. Chinese



aggressiveness over maritime disputes pushes its neighbors into consolidating or developing defensive alliance postures with the US. At least Russia and China have a fair security entente, having settled their border issues and with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization symbolizing a degree of strategic entente over Central Asia. Even if the June 2013 meeting between President Obama and his new Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, saw these two leaders set out to establish a constructive great power relationship, the historical record of recent centuries when there have been multiple great powers competing for primacy is sobering, if not alarming (Mearsheimer 2001).

By contrast, scholars of international relations have endowed the term “security community” with a special meaning, as a group of states that have achieved such a high standard of mutual trust that they share zero mutual threat perceptions (Deutsch 1957). War is inconceivable between them. The EU won the Nobel Prize because it had done just this, overcoming the legacy of two world wars and centuries of conflict. Could there be some initiative to create a climate in which outstanding conflicts would stand a better chance of resolution, and which could lay out a path for the Greater Asia to become in due course, no doubt in many years time, a security community? Europeans would like to see a more normative and less geopolitical order prevail in the Greater Eurasian space as in their general world view, but this runs against very strong nationalist urges driving the other major Eurasian powers – China, India, and Russia. While absent from hard power competition, the EU may on the other hand be better placed to promote constructive alliances that get around the opposing bloc mentalities of north versus south, or old versus new powers.

These various geopolitical realities are very important but not necessarily set in stone, and growing needs for and experience of cooperation can gradually soften the hard edges of geopolitics. Rapid economic and societal development, like in Asia today, shapes the changing of ideas, which lead in due course to political action. We move on therefore to a considerable list of fundamental


long-term issues that are all surely matters of common concern, some of which are currently the subject of obvious ideological or political divergences. The approach can be to explore major topics where all parties are uncertain what the future may hold. The aim would be first at least to develop a common culture of inquiry.

Multipolarity, plurilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism

The discourse of the current champions of multi-polarity is full of references to autonomy, non-interference, and multilateralism. But are these compatible principles? It can be argued that the current enthusiasm for multipolarity has come too late, in the sense that the degree of economic interdependence experienced by the emerging industrial powers has become so intense that an enhanced multilateral order will be in their interests, whereas multipolarity risks creating systemic confusion and instability. The pressure of the BRICS for greater power in the multilateral institutions is a way of reconciling the two at present, but as and when a reasonable reweighting has been achieved, this grouping will have achieved its main purpose, and the core issues of how to guide global governance within the global institutions will be of the essence. There is also tension between global multilateralism and regionalism on a continental or indeed inter-continental scale. Numerous summit declarations advocate both ideas at the same time, but there are real problems of reconciling the two, as evident in the trade policy field and indeed across much of the agenda of the present paper.

Future of international law

A related aspect is how far international law is to grow in reach and acceptance. There are tendencies in the discourse of UN Security Council permanent members such as Russia and China to advocate the rule of international law, but to reduce this in practice to respect for the prerogatives of the permanent members of UNSC. Europe on the other hand sees a much wider role for the growth of international law, including international humanitarian law, environmental law, the law of



the sea, and others. More generally the EU, much more than the US, sees the advance of fields of jurisdiction of international law as central to the evolution of the world order (Scott 2010).

State sovereignty, integration and post-modernism

A further debate exists over the changing place or definition of state sovereignty in a highly interdependent world. The Europeans have pioneered a post-modern concept and reality, in which the extent of supranational policy making and institutions becomes so intense that there is a change of category, from the “modern” state to the “post-modern.” However, the EU model now encounters questions about its sustainability, or whether it needs to jump a further category to a more federal system, a proposition that still encounters deep resistance in many member states. For the time being the emerging nations remain largely wedded to national sovereignty, with only ASEAN engaging in deep regional integration. Hegemonic powers, especially new ones, like to set their own rules rather than take over those already set by the old West — a sentiment that runs deep in Russia and China. But the prosperity of the most advanced of the emerging economies will depend crucially on integration systems, for which the Europe can be viewed as a rich experiment for both its qualities and vulnerabilities.

Economics and sociology of very rapid economic development

Much of Asia is achieving, or aspiring to achieve, very rapid convergence to high levels of economic achievement with a radical diminution of poverty. Yet these economic miracles bring their own problems. One is the now familiar middle income trap, in which economies achieve high enough wage levels to have escaped dire poverty, yet find themselves then ill-equipped to compete with both low-income and highly advanced economies. If this challenge is overcome, the next one is that of achieving a smooth path from very rapid growth onto a path of sustained prosperity at high levels. Here Japan and Korea seem to offer contrasting examples, with Japan having suffered a lost


decade of economic stagnation. Rapid economic development is also associated with drastic opening of the economy and exposure to the dynamics of globalization, with its competitive fragmentation of supply chains. This is linked to the erosion of traditional communities and values, and even their destruction with large-scale migration. Sociologists observe the atomization of society as an undermining the family unit. These extremely difficult and fundamental issues will increasingly set the longer-run context for policy making, requiring research by social scientists, with cross-country comparisons across the Greater Eurasia offering a test-bed of observations.

Development models for advanced commodity exporting economies

Both Russia and Kazakhstan share huge mineral, oil and gas endowments. But both are concerned about being over-dependent on these commodity sectors, to the exclusion of a broader range of competitive industries. The hazards of this situation have become known as Dutch disease, originating from the time when the Netherlands began to exploit huge gas deposits and feared the erosion of its industrial base. The most successful advanced commodity-based economies today are Australia and Canada, and a valuable exchange of experience could be organized with Russia and Kazakhstan, possibly with the assistance of staff work by the OECD.

Aging and demographic decline of societies and work forces

This is the subject of the greatest importance to a key group within the Greater Eurasia, consisting of the EU, Russia, China, and Japan, whereas much of developing Asia does not yet face these issues. Policy issues include the extension of the normal working age in line with improved public health, pension schemes, the provision of services for elderly people, and sociological issues arising from drastically changing age structures of the population. Sharing experience and further research in this domain is highly desirable.



Sequencing and destinations of political and economic evolutions

A further fundamental and highly charged issue, over which there is currently no consensus, is the sequencing of economic versus political reforms. According to one thesis economic development, the escape from poverty, and the satisfaction of basic human needs have to come first. Sophisticated systems of political democracy can come later, also relying on advanced educational standards. A further thesis is that as the market economy develops it requires increasingly the whole infrastructure of democratic governance and independent rule of law. A related issue is defining the scope and content of universal values. Europeans have a deeply entrenched culture of democracy and a legal apparatus for the defence of human rights. Do these represent universal values or standards to which other societies will converge alongside economic development? A famous, and now more infamous book, entitled *The End of History* argued that with the collapse of communism the whole world was due to converge on Western liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992). Western political philosophers are now more cautious, warning against such simplistic assumptions, partly fuelled by observations of the failings of many semi-democratic regimes (Gray 1997).

Philosophies of life and spirituality


Finally, one may reflect on what might be the philosophies of life in a Greater Eurasia, thus the most intangible but maybe most important matter of all. Taken to their starkest extremes one may compare on the one hand “Wall Street,” meaning the ruthless workings of financial markets, undiluted materialism, competitiveness in everything including individual personal relations, and huge income inequalities; and on the other hand the Buddhist philosophies of anti-materialism and meditation. Between these extremes, one can observe in Europe societal pressures leading to political interest in adding “happiness” to the conventional pursuit of economic growth, which becomes however a major analytical challenge for the social scientists and politicians alike. A

recent survey compares the approaches in Europe, Australia and New Zealand with that of Bhutan, which has established its gross national happiness (GNH) index as guide to public policy, suggesting that western and Buddhist thinking may not be so irreconcilable (Hall and Richard 2013). For Asia the struggle to end extreme poverty has to rely broadly on Western market economics. But here already there are major variations within the West between Europe and the US on social policies and philosophies, and differences in Asian cultures would be even greater. Meanwhile some current manifestations of the new capitalism in both China and Russia even outdo Wall Street for extreme luxury consumerism, but is this going to be the essence of modern Asia? Many Europeans who are now getting to know Asia better are deeply impressed by Asian cultures, which themselves span a huge variety. There is no single Asia.

There is already a rich two-way flow of intercultural influences at work, which globalization serves to accelerate. An example of a huge and intriguing question is whether today’s Confucianism in China can be a basis for comparison and convergence with European values. The point of rapprochement is that while Confucianism is not considered to be a religion, since it has no God to worship, contemporary Europe has become increasingly atheist too. Yet Christian ethics remain profoundly anchored in European culture, while Confucianism is also all about ethics.

How? Organization of a Greater Eurasia

The agendas of immediate and long-term issues of common concern across the Greater Eurasia are substantial enough to warrant a unifying concept and vision. There could be a political declaration by all the parties announcing and defining a Greater Eurasia initiative, which would be the political reference document to support relevant initiatives. The preparation of this declaration should be the subject of thorough debate and dialogue among all presumed participants, but a lead could for example be taken at the next Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) at summit level in 2014, since this is the gathering that comes closest to



embracing the whole of European and Asia (we return to ASEM below).

There would also be questions of which organization or network would be responsible for operational activities. The idea of creating some major new structure lying between the global institutions (UN, IFIs, G20) and the dense networks of Asian and European structures would encounter obvious objections over wasteful duplication and undermining of these existing structures. This hypothesis is therefore set aside. More plausible alternatives could be envisaged under the headings of Eurasianization and variable geometry.

“Eurasianization” would mean some carefully calibrated and reciprocal openings of several European and Asian organizations or fora to each other. As regards to where the balance would lie as between European opening to Asia versus Asian opening to Europe, there are possibilities for both, as detailed below. However the latter would have the advantage that Europe could be represented by the EU alone, or the EU plus just its G20 member states, thus avoiding unwieldy meeting with very large numbers. New institutional initiatives would be limited to specifically justified purposes not suitably covered by existing organizations.

The Greater Eurasia would thus see a loose network structure, with a set of policy-specific initiatives based on what Europeans call “variable geometry” format, i.e., with overlapping but differentiated membership. A further feature, flowing from the variable geometry, would be the holding of multiple meetings sequentially at the same venue among largely overlapping groups, especially at summit level in the interests of economy of time and effort (at which the East and Southeast Asians are already adept) (Box 1 and Annex 1).

There are already tendencies in these directions. Both Europe and Asia see matryoshka-type sets of concentric circles, which lend themselves to the above design features, with the outer circles more naturally open for Eurasianization.

The most dense Asian integration organization is undoubtedly **ASEAN**, whose ten member states have a combined population of 600 million — more

than the EU or US but less than China. ASEAN is already multi-functional with ministerial activity across the whole range of government departments, including defence cooperation under the ADMM and ADMM-plus labels (the plus meaning +China). A further impressive aspect of ASEAN, which is highly relevant for the present purpose, is how it has also managed to become the center of gravity for a widening and deepening of Asian regional initiatives. This is symbolized by the willingness of the three major East Asian powers — China, Korea, and Japan — to meet together under the label of ASEAN+3 (which inspires our suggestion of a Greater Eurasia+2). It has led on to an ASEAN+6 with the adding of Australia, New Zealand and India in the **Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)** now under development.

For some time there was the idea that the ASEAN+3 might morph into an East Asian Community, implying much more than trade integration. However more recently the **East Asia Summit (EAS)** process has both taken the initiative as the leading political forum for Asian affairs and embraced not only to the ASEAN+6 but also added a further crucial +2 with the US and Russia joining in as full participants. These summits are held alongside ASEAN summits.

An issue for a Greater Eurasia is whether the EU will also accede to the East Asia Summit. The EU has taken a preliminary step in this direction by acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which is viewed as a necessary but not sufficient condition for acceding to the East Asia Summit; this second step requires a further political agreement among the existing members. The diplomatic-political view seems to be that the EU has to justify its value to the EAS before this would be agreed. Its qualifications could be its support for ASEAN and expertise on integration and its status as China’s largest trading partner. Also helpful are the Lisbon Treaty provisions, which created the single and permanent EU foreign policy representative, since the EAS would doubtless not want to be cluttered up with a crowd of Europeans. However, more substantial reasons

Box
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Summary of East and South-East Asian regionalism


| Economic organisations/agreements | Political, foreign & security policy |
|--|--|
| <p>ASEAN (10), aims at upgrade into ASEAN Economic Community & single market by 2015, work in progress, may take longer.</p> <p>ASEAN+3, =+C, K, J have bilateral-regional FTAs with ASEAN; 3 now discuss/negotiate FTAs between each other, but a long way off conclusion.</p> | <p>ASEAN (10) and ASEAN defence (ADMM-plus)</p> <p>ASEAN+3, summit meetings, idea of an integrated East Asian Community sometimes mentioned.</p> |
| <p>RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) = ASEAN+3, +3 (Aus, NZ, Ind) all have bilateral FTAs with ASEAN, but now discuss plurilateral & comprehensive FTA, but only beginning.</p> | <p>EAS (East Asia Summit) = ASEAN+3, +3, +US, RUS. Candidates: EU and 5 other Asians. Accession to TAC (Treaty of Amity and Friendship) necessary but not sufficient condition for EAS.</p> |
| <p>TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) 'Quality FTAs', first 4 Sing, NZ, Chile, Brunei, +US, Aus, Peru, Viet, Malay, + soon Can, J, Mex.</p> | <p>ARF (Asia Regional Forum) = EAS+Can, EU, Bangl, Pak, Mong, Sri, Png, Tim. For security cooperation.</p> |
| <p>APEC (Asia Pacific Economic cooperation) (21) = ASEAN (7 only), +3, +Aus, NZ, US, Can, Rus, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Peru, Mex, Chile, Png. Business promotion and regional awareness forum</p> | <p>ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) = EU incl. all member states, ASEM+3, +3, + Rus, Pak, Mong. General political forum.</p> |

could be developed, for example activism in trying to think through long-term rationalization of Greater Eurasian trade structures and land-based transport corridors, proposals for major research and educational initiatives (see further below), and indeed in promoting debate over the Greater Eurasia idea itself.

But the East Asia Summit process is not the only wider and enlarging group. The **ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)** was initiated in 1993 by ASEAN to promote dialogue and confidence building on political and security issues. Its normative principles are set out in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which actually dates back to as far back as 1976, the year after the Helsinki Final Act was adopted. It seems to be no coincidence that there is a high degree of commonality

between the TAC and Helsinki normative principles (See Annex 6). The ARF's membership today includes all ASEAN+6 states, plus Russia, US, Canada, with the EU having an advanced observer status. Sometimes described as Asia's OSCE, the ARF is headquartered in Jakarta together with the ASEAN secretariat. For the Greater Eurasia the firming up of the EU's full participation would be a plausible step.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is an older forum established in 1989, aiming at economic integration initiated by Australia, including all of today's ASEAN+6 members, as well as east Pacific states of the Americas. Beyond its annual summit meeting, APEC organizes a large number of working groups devoted to economic and business themes, with the aid



of a secretariat located in Singapore. In 2004 it adopted goals of achieving open trade and investment for industrialized countries by 2010 and for developing economies by 2020, later in 2006 launching the idea of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). However this plan has not materialized, whereas other regional initiatives have advanced further.

In particular since 2010 there have been active negotiations for a **Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)**, building on the “high quality” free trade agreements made in 2005 by just four countries of the Asia-Pacific region: Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei. After this small start the initiative has acquired strategic proportions more recently, with the accession of Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and the United States. For the US this appears as the leading economic element in its pivot to Asia. However, key questions here concern China, Japan, and Korea, with only Japan for the time expressing active interest in acceding. Is this to be an “everyone-but-China club,” or will China as well as Korea join in too? These seem to be unanswered questions with implicit geopolitical overtones.

The **Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)** comes closest in extent to covering the whole of Greater Eurasia, its membership including the European Union and all its member states, Russia and almost all of Asia, with the exceptions of Central Asia and Iran, but including Australia and New Zealand. Also Turkey is surprisingly not included, although Norway and Switzerland now join in. ASEM meets once every two years at summit level, with 51 national delegations, plus the EU and ASEAN institutions. The setting of the agenda and drafting of the concluding declarations tend to be led by the EU side, but there is a 2+2 coordination structure, i.e., with two parties from each side. Since ASEM has a format that could provide the basis for much increased initiatives at the Greater Eurasia level, some detail of how this might be done is given in Box 2. Rather, as the US has made the TPP a symbol and instrument of its new pivot to Asia, so the EU could re-invent ASEM to signal its own quite different pivot to

Asia. While ASEM's founding agreement stated its informal and non-institutionalized nature, the time has come to reconsider this, and indeed re-invent ASEM which in any case is in need of a fresh impetus.

There are several Europe-centered organizations, which could be candidates for greater degrees of Eurasianization, albeit of limited extent. The **OECD** long ago dropped its original European mission in favor of a global mission for serving the world's most advanced economies, with Japan, Korea, and Mexico adding to North America and Australasia. Russia's accession has been under preparation for some years. At its recent annual ministerial meeting, China, Indonesia, and India were invited as ‘key partners, which could lead to full membership in due course. Kazakhstan has applied for membership. The organization already has a regional program for Southeast Asia and another program working on the problems of mega-cities, most of which are in Asia.

The **Energy Charter**, while highly specialised in its functions, already sees a substantial and increasing Eurasianization. It was born out of the early post-Soviet period as an attempt to bring the EU and Russia together in what was hoped to become a model case of sectoral integration, drawing inspiration from the European Coal and Steel Community founded in the early post-world war period. From the start, the Charter included all of Europe and the post-Soviet space, plus Mongolia, Japan, and Australia, with other Asian observers including China and the Arab Gulf states. Development of the organization has been hampered by Russia's non-ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty. Nonetheless the organization adopted in 2009 a road map for its “expansion, outreach and consolidation.” In 2013 Afghanistan acceded as full member, and the same process is underway for Pakistan. China is an increasingly active observer. Consideration is being given to the possible revision of the Charter document (but not the legally binding Treaty) to remove now irrelevant European language to make the organization more attractive to Asian states. A restructuring of this organization, for it become more fully operational

Box
2

Proposals for enhancing ASEM

1. **Create a permanent secretariat** to boost common ownership of the process and be a source of ideas for new initiatives. This might be based in Singapore, building on the existing Asia Europe Foundations there, which is ASEM's only institutionalised structure so far, or in a more central location such as Delhi.

2. **Reform the nature of the deliverables** from the next summit in 2014 in Brussels. There should be less time and effort devoted to the production of the extremely long and often banal conclusions and instead an focus on operational initiatives.

3. **Take up as the theme for the next summit "Greater Eurasian Inter-Connectivity,"** with operational implications for land-based transport and IT interconnectivity, as well as security risks (drugs, trafficking, illegal migration, cross-border terrorism). For this purpose Central Asian participation is needed, and at a minimum Kazakhstan could be invited as a special guest in view of its large central place on the map of the Greater Eurasia.

4. **Resort to more flexible and compact formats, limiting the recourse to plenary session of over 50 parties.** For example many concrete projects could be limited to the most interested and capable parties; this begins to be done but would need to be much more developed alongside increased operational activity. The Greater Eurasian members of G20 could have side meetings alongside regular G20 events to develop ideas to be put to ASEM as a whole.


5. **Substantially increase European and Asian funding for common research and educational initiatives.** Build on the functions of the Asia Europe Foundation, making of this a substantial rather than only token activity. European funding could be obtained in part by reorienting some current EU programmes in South, Southeast, and East Asia, which amount to the top-down promotion of European values. The time has come for a more horizontal joint approach to matters of common concern.

in the Greater Eurasia, could see expanded plenary membership to include China, India, Korea, Indonesia, and Gulf states.

As already noted above there is a high degree of normative commonality between the **OSCE** and its Helsinki principles and the ASEAN Regional Forum and the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia (TAC). The OSCE is already Eurasian to the extent that it includes all of Central Asia. Hypothetically one might discuss a merger of the two. But since both OSCE and the ASEAN Regional Forum are extensive in their membership and quite weak in real impact, this does not sound plausible, but a structured cooperative between the two could be developed, especially in relation to the security issues around post-2014 Afghanistan. Going one step further, Afghanistan might be invited to accede to the

OSCE, leading on to operational activities linked to Central Asia.

The **Council of Europe** extends as far as Vladivostok but not into Central Asia. However, Kazakhstan has expressed increasing interest in a human rights policy and could be a candidate for an associate relationship with the Council of Europe, whose Court of Human Rights has unique experience in developing the jurisprudence and case law of human rights at the international level. A new initiative in Asia came in 2009 with establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), leading to adoption in November 2012 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. This may be only a beginning, but it provides a basis for progress, with encouragement coming from recent changes in Myanmar. There could be opened up a program of



cooperation between the AICHR and the Council of Europe and its Court of Human Rights. .

The **UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)**, while an organization with a very reduced function, has nonetheless been making a contribution toward extending European-based norms for land transport into Central Asia and further into Asia. It inaugurates the first Europe-Asia Road Safety Forum in Delhi in December 2013.

Returning to Asia-centered organizations, one could consider the **Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)**, headquartered in Beijing (rather than Shanghai), as an institution to build on. Its full members are only China, Russia, and the five Central Asian states, but its observers and dialogue partners include India, Pakistan, Mongolia, Iran, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Belarus, and most recently Turkey. The leading question here is whether the SCO is to remain centered on its initial role as a Chinese-Russian entente with Central Asia or broadened out as a wider Eurasian security organization. The large expansion of its observer members and dialogue partners suggests the latter. In which case a next move would be for all of the observers and partners to become full members and for the core Central Asia interests of SCO to be redefined to include Afghanistan. Its priority interests in relation to post-2014 Afghanistan would include both security risks and the opportunities for building north-south as well as east-west links. The EU might then also become an observer of this new SCO and later accede to full membership as and when the geopolitical environment favored this.


Largely overlapping with this possible evolution of the SCO, since 2011 there has been an informal grouping dedicated to the post-2014 Afghanistan nexus of issues, known as the **Istanbul Process** after the location of its first meeting, and subsequently also called the Heart of Asia after its third ministerial meeting was chaired by Kazakhstan in Astana in April 2013. Its membership exemplifies a traditional conception of “Eurasian,” with Russia and Turkey in addition to all Asian states near to Afghanistan but without European participation. The US, EU, and seven EU member states have

indicated their support for the process. If its operational significance develops the process could well become a specific-purpose Greater Eurasia+2 construction.

Since its inception in 1996 the **Arctic Council** has strengthened institutionally, with a permanent secretariat now in Norway, alongside growing awareness of the region’s challenges and opportunities in the realms of sea transport, energy production, and environmental hazards. Its membership consists of the Nordic states, Canada, Russia, the US, and a widening number of observer states. In May 2013 it admitted six new non-Arctic states as permanent observers, all from Greater Eurasia: China, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Singapore, adding to seven other EU member states; thus a specific-purpose organization also with a Greater Eurasia+2 profile.

Many of the fundamental long-term political, economic, and societal issues discussed above are not ripe for immediate political action but are suitable for collaborative research efforts by social scientists across the Greater Eurasia and thus for thinking ahead of officialdom that is inevitably tied closely to the status quo. In 2003 ASEAN+3 initiated the **Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT)** to promote regional economic integration. In 2007 the East Asia Summit established the **Economic Research Institute of ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)** on a wider ASEAN+6 basis (i.e. bringing in Australia, New Zealand, and India), which links to a network of 16 national research institutes with objectives of both research and “track 2” diplomacy. These networks are analogous to the **European Policy and Institute Network (EPIN)**, which brings together 35 EU-based think tanks.

Bringing research communities and educational programs together across the Greater Eurasia should be viewed as a step towards engineering a greater normative convergence. If today’s PhD graduates in the social sciences undertake their researches in a cosmopolitan Greater Eurasian academic environment, then tomorrow’s leaders will be well on the road towards greater harmony on crucial matters of political and security norms.



A small step already in this direction has been taken by the ASEM in creating the **Asia Europe Foundation** headquartered in Singapore, which is responsible for projects in the economic, political, educational, and cultural domains and is funded by voluntary contributions from Europe and Asia currently totalling about €3 million per year. The themes addressed by the foundation are a good basis for a much bigger and indeed strategic initiative. But the question of scale is posed: should there be just a token activity as at present, or one that would in the long-run have strategic significance? The EU's experience in creating a continental research community in Europe provides some points of reference. The EU's research program currently has an operating budget of €7 billion per year, covering both social and natural sciences. A prerequisite for project selection is that applicants have to be a multi-national consortium, and this has over several decades actually transformed the European research efforts away from predominantly national programs into an integrated European research community. If the objective were to achieve a Greater Eurasian research community within two to three decades, it should get started with funding in the region of hundreds of million of euro per year. Think tank networks of the Greater Eurasia could be established, but this should not run the risk of creating monopolizing structures. A main lesson of experience in the EU is to keep competition open between different networks or research consortia through continuous competitive tendering of projects rather than monopolistic network structures.

In the field of educational initiatives much has already been done in recent decades, with large numbers of Chinese managing to do higher educational studies and research in US universities in particular. If there were to be a major initiative at the level of the Greater Eurasia there are some parameters to be born in mind from European experience with the Erasmus program. The norm now in the EU is for university students to spend one year of study away from their home countries. Currently the Erasmus program sees 230,000 students per year study away from home in 33


countries and in 4,000 partner universities at a budgetary cost of €450 million. A sister program called Erasmus Mundus extends the model outside Europe, but on a relatively small scale.

In terms of infrastructure financing and development, there are four key players across the Greater Eurasia: the Asian Development Bank headquartered in Manila, the EurAsian Development Bank headquartered in Almaty, the European Investment Bank headquartered in Luxembourg, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London, with the World Bank often joining in as partner with each of them. There are coordination processes at work between these banks in some theaters of operation, but this could be more actively structured. However these will have to overcome important inter- and intra-institutional barriers if they were to support Greater Eurasian integration effectively.

The case for a core leadership group of the Greater Eurasia may also be considered, although any formalization of such groups would encounter objections from the excluded. One formula that would take advantage of existing structures would be to group together the Greater Eurasian members of G20, with its five Asian states (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea), two Eurasians (Russia and Turkey), one "new Eurasian" (Australia), and the EU with its four G20 member states (Germany, France, UK, Italy) This could have side meetings alongside full G20 meetings, with agenda items more relevant for this group than the plenary G20. Such agenda items are not so difficult to imagine, such as rationalization of preferential trade areas and major land-based transport corridors across the Greater Eurasian area, as well as other major initiatives in fields such as education and research, even before tackling more difficult political and security topics.

Conclusions

The most concrete rationale for a Greater Eurasia is founded on the realities of land connections, which translate into the physical movement of both "goods" and "bads" — trade, tourism, migration, drugs, pandemics, criminality, and terror.



All of these need cooperative management across the Greater Eurasian space. But in addition, there is a case for the states and peoples of the Greater Eurasia to engage together in thinking about their major long-term challenges of political, economic, and societal natures. This is a vast agenda, including such issues as multipolarity and multilateralism, state sovereignty, international law and post-modernism, the forging of a security community, the transition to advanced economies, the evolution of political regimes, and philosophies of life and spirituality.

On how to organize activity at the level of a Greater Eurasia, any proposals have to be adapted to the realities of existing structures, characterized by the integration movements in both Europe and Asia, as well as the major inter-continental Euro-Atlantic and Asian-Pacific structures. Greater Eurasian integration across the super-continental landmass is the missing element in these fast-developing structures. However there would surely be no votes for creating a grand new structure that would duplicate or rival existing multilateral and regional organizations. On the other hand there could well be favored an evolutionary approach in which some existing European-centered and some Asian-centered organizations would be selectively Eurasianized by reciprocal openings to each other, a process that is already visible but which could be further advanced. The model therefore would be more one of a loose network of overlapping organizations and fora. The proliferating initiatives for widening and deepening Asian regionalism are surely going to call for some consolidation and rationalization, and providing for the future place of the Greater Eurasia could be part of the process.

We conclude by highlighting a few issues of strategic significance for the progressive integration of this vast area. Since a key issue is how the EU comes to terms with the fast developing and integrating Asia, we place a special responsibility on what initiatives the EU might itself take.

The forum that comes closest to embracing the Greater Eurasia is the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), which could be built on but would need a serious review and recalibration. It could be the symbol of

a European pivot to Asia. It should be made more jointly owned, rather than overly dependent on the EU, for which purpose the EU could agree to Asian requests to set up a joint secretariat. ASEM should then focus its energies more on concrete actions and less on negotiating long declarations, prioritizing for the foreseeable future issues of inter-connectivity across this vast landmass. With priority for inter-connectivity, Central Asia would need to be brought into ASEM, especially Kazakhstan in view of its large place at the center of the landmass. There should also be substantial increases in both European and Asian funding for common research and educational initiatives, including on longer-term issues.

ASEAN is seeking to advance its already impressive integration in the next year or so to a new qualitative level, to be called the ASEAN Economic Community. As and when this is done, the scene would be set for a region-to-region free trade agreement between ASEAN and the EU to take over from current bilateral initiatives. The EU should also intensify its participation in other Asian regional fora, for which the foregoing actions would be justifications.

Russia for its part, while active in many Asian political initiatives, is the only major economy that is not opening itself to any important Eurasian free trade area, except for its proposed Eurasian Union which is only a small affair economically. By contrast, there is a sound case for what President Putin has called a single economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Maybe this will come in due course, but it is not advancing as of now, and Russia's own modernisation is prejudiced as a result.

Trust is a prerequisite of integration across the Greater Eurasia. Here China has a uniquely important role, with its external policies long projected under the banner of "the harmonious rise of China." Development contributions by China have acquired a strong reputation for speed and effectiveness, which is clearly evident in Central Asia with major its infrastructure projects. However the admirable "harmonious rise" objective is now being tarnished by forceful actions over maritime




borders in the China seas, aggravated by Japan's increasingly assertive stance. It would be greatly welcomed if China's new leadership judged that the time was now ripe to ease these tensions by greater recourse to the mechanisms of international law to resolve such disputes, supported by political acts of reconciliation that would also have to involve Japan. Progress over these issues would resonate positively way beyond the China Seas and represent a strong confidence building measure across the whole of the Greater Eurasia.

A Greater Eurasia process would need to be started and announced with a political declaration, which would have overarching normative content and a sketch of long-term objectives. The next ASEM summit in 2014 could be an occasion to launch this.

Annex 1: East, Southeast, and South Asian Circles

| | ASEAN | ASEAN + 3,+3, RCEP | ARF | APEC | TPP | SAARC | TAC/EAS |
|---------------|-------|--------------------|-----|------|-----|-------|---------|
| Brunei | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| Cambodia | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Indonesia | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Laos | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Malaysia | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| Myanmar | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Philippines | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Singapore | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| Thailand | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Vietnam | x | X | X | X | X | | X |
| China | | X | X | X | | | X |
| Hong Kong | | | | X | | | |
| Taiwan | | | | X | | | |
| Japan | | X | X | X | * | | X |
| Korea (S) | | X | X | X | | | X |
| Mongolia | | | X | X | | | * |
| Korea (N) | | | X | X | | | |
| Papua N.Guin. | | | X | X | | | |
| Timor-Leste | | | X | X | | | |
| India | | X | X | X | | X | X |
| Afghanistan | | | | | | X | |
| Bangladesh | | | | | | X | |
| Bhutan | | | | | | X | |
| Maldives | | | | | | X | |
| Nepal | | | | | | X | |
| Sri Lanka | | | | | | X | |
| Pakistan | | | X | X | | X | * |
| Russia | | | X | X | | | X |
| Australia | | X | X | X | | | X |
| New Zealand | | X | X | X | X | | X |



| | ASEAN | ASEAN + 3,+3, RCEP | ARF | APEC | TPP | SAARC | TAC/ EAS |
|--------|-------|--------------------------|-----|------|-----|-------|-------------|
| Canada | | | X | X | | | |
| US | | | X | X | X | | |
| Chile | | | | X | X | | |
| Peru | | | | X | | | |
| EU | | | X | | | | * |

* negotiating accession

ASEAN – Association of South East Asian Nations

ASEAN + 3 ... China, Korea, Japan, +3 ... India, Australia, New Zealand

ARF – Asian Regional Forum

RCEP – Regional Comprehensive Economic Process

APEC – Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

TPP – Trans Pacific Partnership

TAC, EAS – Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, East Asia Summit

SAARC – South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation

Annex 2: Russian, Central Asian, and Eurasian Circles


| | Customs Union | EurAsEC | CSTO | CIS | SCO | Istanbul/ Afghan Process |
|-----------------|---------------|---------|------|-----|-----|-----------------------------|
| Russia | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Belarus | X | X | X | X | * | |
| Kazakhstan | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Kyrgyzstan | * | X | X | X | X | X |
| Tajikistan | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Turkmenistan | | | | * | X | X |
| Uzbekistan | | | | X | X | X |
| Armenia | | * | | X | | |
| Georgia | | | | | | |
| Moldova | | * | | X | | |
| Ukraine | | * | | X | | |
| Turkey | | | | | * | X |
| China | | | | | X | X |
| India | | | | | * | X |
| Pakistan | | | | | * | X |
| Iran | | | | | * | X |
| Azerbaijan | | | | | | X |
| Saudi Arabia | | | | | | X |
| United Arab Em. | | | | | | X |

* signifies incomplete membership: observer, or associate, or incomplete ratification, or under negotiation

EurAsEC – Eurasian Economic Cooperation
 CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organisation
 CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
 SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Annex 3: European Circles

| | EU | EEA + CH | Enlarge/ Memb. Perspec. | ENP South & East | Council of Europe | OSCE | Central Asia Strategy |
|---------------|----|----------|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------|-----------------------------|
| EU 27 | X | X | | | X | X | X |
| Norway | | X | | | X | X | |
| Liechtenstein | | X | | | X | X | |
| Iceland | | X | X | | X | X | |
| Switzerland | | X | | | X | X | |
| Croatia | | | X | | X | X | |
| Turkey | | | X | | X | X | |
| Montenegro | | | X | | X | X | |
| Macedonia | | | X | | X | X | |
| Serbia | | | X | | X | X | |
| Albania | | | X | | X | X | |
| Bosnia | | | X | | X | X | |
| Kosovo | | | X | | | | |
| Algeria | | | | X | | | |
| Egypt | | | | X | | | |
| Israel | | | | X | | | |
| Jordan | | | | X | | | |
| Lebanon | | | | X | | | |
| Libya | | | | X | | | |
| Morocco | | | | X | | | |
| Palestine | | | | X | | | |
| Syria | | | | X | | | |
| Tunisia | | | | X | | | |
| Azerbaijan | | | | X | X | X | |
| Armenia | | | | X | X | X | |
| Belarus | | | | X | X | X | |
| Georgia | | | | X | X | X | |
| Moldova | | | | X | X | X | |
| Ukraine | | | | x | X | X | |
| Russia | | | | | X | X | |



| | EU | EEA + CH | Enlarge/ Memb. Perspec. | ENP South & East | Council of Europe | OSCE | Central Asia Strategy |
|--------------|----|----------|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------|-----------------------------|
| Kazakhstan | | | | | | X | X |
| Kyrgyzstan | | | | | | X | X |
| Tajikistan | | | | | | X | X |
| Turkmenistan | | | | | | X | X |
| Uzbekistan | | | | | | X | X |
| US | | | | | | X | |

EEA – European Economic Area

ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe



Annex 4: States of Greater Eurasia in the Top 12 by Population, Landmass, or GDP and Their Political Regimes

| Region/Country | | Democratic | Semi-democratic | Non-democratic |
|----------------|-------------|------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Asia | | | | |
| 1. | China | | | 7 |
| 2. | India | 2 | | |
| 3. | Indonesia | 2 | | |
| 4. | Pakistan | | 4 | |
| 5. | Bangladesh | | 3 | |
| 6. | Japan | 1 | | |
| 7. | Vietnam | .. | .. | .. |
| 8. | Philippines | | 3 | |
| 9. | Iran | | | 6 |
| 10. | Mongolia | 1 | | |
| 11. | Myanmar | .. | .. | .. |
| 12. | Afghanistan | | | 6 |
| 13. | Korea | 1 | | |
| 14. | Thailand | | | |
| 15. | Uzbekistan | | | 7 |
| 16. | Malaysia | | 4 | |
| 17. | Singapore | | 4 | |
| Eurasia | | | | |
| 18. | Russia | | | 6 |
| 19. | Turkey | | 3 | |
| 20. | Kazakhstan | | | 6 |
| Europe | | | | |
| 21. | Germany | 1 | | |
| 22. | France | 1 | | |
| 23. | UK | 1 | | |
| 24. | Italy | 2 | | |
| 25. | Spain | 1 | | |
| 26. | Ukraine | | 4 | |

Highlighted are 12 states, plus the EU, which are G20 members.

Source: Freedom House



Annex 5: Megacities of the Greater Eurasia

| Megacity | Continent | Population | Annual Growth |
|-----------|-----------|------------|---------------|
| Tokyo | Asia | 35,682,460 | 0.60% |
| Jakarta | Asia | 28,019,545 | 2.20% |
| Seoul | Asia | 25,600,000 | 1.40% |
| Shanghai | Asia | 25,300,000 | 2.20% |
| Karachi | Asia | 23,500,000 | 4.90% |
| Delhi | Asia | 23,000,000 | 4.60% |
| Mumbai | Asia | 20,800,000 | 2.90% |
| Manila | Asia | 20,700,000 | 2.50% |
| Osaka | Asia | 16,800,000 | 0.15% |
| Beijing | Asia | 16,400,000 | 2.70% |
| Kolkata | Asia | 15,700,000 | 2.00% |
| Dhaka | Asia | 14,000,000 | 4.10% |
| Bangkok | Asia | 13,800,000 | 0.90% |
| Tehran | Asia | 13,500,000 | 2.60% |
| Guangzhou | Asia | 12,700,800 | 4.00% |
| Lahore | Asia | 12,500,000 | 2.00% |
| Istanbul | Eurasia | 13,850,000 | 2.80% |
| Moscow | Europe | 16,200,000 | 0.20% |
| London | Europe | 12,600,000 | 0.70% |
| Paris | Europe | 10,600,000 | 1.00% |



Annex 6: Basic Principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

Helsinki Basic Principles, 1975

1. Sovereign equality
2. Refraining for the threat or use of force
3. Inviolability of frontiers
4. Territorial integrity of states
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
9. Cooperation among states
10. Fulfilment of obligations under international law

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 1976, fundamental principles

1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations
2. The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another
4. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means
5. Renunciation of the threat or use of force
6. Effective cooperation among themselves



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